We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not be socially acceptable. However, if preferences are single-peaked or satisfy the single-crossing property, any Condorcet winner is socially acceptable.
Definition 2 Let π be a preference profile. We say that alternative a ∈ A is socially acceptable with respect to π if the number of individuals whose preferences place a above the line is at least as large as the number of individuals whose preferences place it below the line.
Mahajne and Volij [6] showed that every preference profile has a socially acceptable alternative. The next example shows that a Condorcet winner may not be socially acceptable.
Example 1 Assume A = {a, b, c, d} and consider the preference profile (abcd, acbd, cdab, cbad, bdac).
It can be seen that whereas alternative a is a Condorcet winner, it is not socially acceptable.
The only socially acceptable alternatives are b and c.
The concept of a Condorcet winner can be strengthened by requiring that the alternative be preferred to any other alternative by at least a given proportion of the voters.
Definition 3 Let π = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ) be a preference profile, and let a ∈ A be an alternative.
For q ∈ (1/2, 1) we say that a is a q-Condorcet winner for π if for every alternative a ′ ∈ A the number of individuals who prefer a to a ′ is greater or equal to a fraction q of the number of individuals. Namely, if µ π (C(a → a ′ )) ≥ qn for all a ′ ∈ A \ {a}.
The concepts of q-Condorcet winner and q-majority equilibrium have been studied in Greenberg [5] , Sari [10] , Baharad and Nitzan [1] , and Courtin et al. [3] . The following result
shows that for large enough q, any q-Condorcet winner is socially acceptable.
and let π be a preference profile for which alternative a is a q-Condorcet winner. Then a is socially acceptable.
Proof : Let a be a q-Condorcet winner for π and let
n for all a ′ ∈ A \ {a} we have that
Assume by contradiction that a is not socially acceptable. Then, there are proportions α and β, with α < β such that a proportion α of individuals places a below the line and a proportion β places a above the line. Let π ′ be the preference profile that is obtained from π by sending alternative a to the top of each preference relation that places it above the line and by sending a to the (K + 1)/2 + 1-th rank (just below the line) of each preference relation that places it below the line. By construction, a is not socially acceptable for π ′ and
where we have used the fact that 1/2 < α < β. This inequality contradicts inequality 1. ✷
The bound (3K − 4)/(4K − 4) cannot be improved. To see this, let K = 4 so that the bound equals 2/3. Let q < 2/3. We will construct a preference profile for which alternative a is a q-Condorcet winner but is not socially acceptable. Let m be a positive integer such that q ≤ (4m + 1)/(6m + 3) and let π be a preference profile with m individuals having preference In this section we restrict attention to single-peaked preferences and show that in this case, any Condorcet winner is socially acceptable.
1
Definition 4 Let A be a set of K alternatives and let ≤ be a linear order on A. We say that the preference relation ≻ is single-peaked with respect to ≤ if there is an alternative
Theorem 1 Let ≤ be the linear order on A and assume without loss of generality that
Let π be a preference profile of single-peaked preferences with respect to ≤, and let a ∈ A be a Condorcet winner with respect to π. Then a is socially acceptable for π.
⌉+k and let ≻ be a preference relation in the profile. It cannot be the case that both a and b are placed above the line by ⌉ which is impossible. As a result, ≻ places a above the line if and only if a ≻ b. Consequently, the number of voters who place a above the line equals the number of voters in the profile who prefer a to b. Since a is a Condorcet winner, this number is at least n/2 and therefore it is at least as large as the number of voters that place a below the line. In other words, a is socially acceptable with respect to π.
⌉ and let ≻ be a preference relation in the profile. It cannot be the case that both a and b are placed above the line by ≻. For, in that case, since preferences are single-peaked with respect to ≤, a ℓ would be above the line for all
⌉, . . . , k. But this means that more than K/2 alternatives would be above the line, which is impossible. On the other hand, it cannot be the case that both a and b are placed below the line by ≻. For, in that case, since preferences are single-peaked with respect to ≤, the number of alternatives placed above the line by ≻ would be at most (k
⌉ which is less than
, which is impossible.
Finally, if a is on the line, then b is above the line. For if it was below the line, the number of alternatives above the line would be at most (k
⌉ which is less
, which is impossible. As a result, ≻ places a above the line if and only if a ≻ b.
Consequently, the number of voters who place a above the line equals the number of voters in the profile who prefer a to b. Since a is a Condorcet winner, this number is at least n/2 and therefore it is at least as large as the number of voters that place a below the line. In other words, a is socially acceptable with respect to π.
Case 2: a = a (K+1)/2 . In this case, alternative a cannot be below the line for any of the
for some preference relation ≻ that is singlepeaked with respect to ≤. Then we must have that rank ≻ (a k ) > (K + 1)/2 either for all
In either case we would have that more than half of the alternatives have a rank higher than K/2, which is impossible. As a result, a is socially acceptable with respect to π. ✷
Single-Crossing Preferences
We now restrict attention to the class of preferences that satisfy the single-crossing property.
This class has been introduced by Roberts [7] and has been shown to admit a majority voting equilibrium. See for instance Rothstein [8, 9] , Gans and Smart [4] , as well as Saporiti and
Tohmé [11] . Roughly speaking, a set of preferences satisfies the single-crossing property if both the preferences and the alternatives can be ordered from "left" to "right" so that if a rightist preference prefers an alternative that is to the left of another alternative, then so do all preferences that are to the left of this preference.
Definition 5 Let ≤ be a linear order on A. Let C ⊆ P be a nonempty subset of preferences and let ⊑ be a linear order on C. We say that the preference relations in C satisfy the single-crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑) if for all pairs of alternatives a, b ∈ A and for all pairs of preferences ≻, ≻ ′ ∈ C, we have
We also say that the profile π = {≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n } satisfies the single-crossing property if there is a linear order ≤ on A and a linear order ⊑ on the set π(N ) of preferences in the profile, such that the preferences in π(N ) satisfy the single crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑).
Example 2 Let the set of alternatives be A = {a, b, c} with the linear order given by a < b < c. Consider the subset C ⊆ P that contains the following four preference relations:
with the linear order given by ≻ 1 ❁≻ 2 ❁≻ 3 ❁≻ 4 . It can be checked that the preferences in C satisfy the single-crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑). Indeed, note that the preferences in C that rank alternative c over alternative a are ≻ 3 and ≻ 4 . Similarly, the preferences in C that rank alternative c over alternative b are ≻ 2 , ≻ 3 and ≻ 4 . Finally, the only preference in C that ranks alternative b over alternative a is ≻ 4 . The reader can check that the preferences in C are not single-peaked with respect to any linear order on A.
The following claim states a useful property of single-crossing preferences. Namely, if two individuals agree on the ranking of two alternatives, so do all individuals who are ideologically "between" them. When a set of preferences is ordered by ⊑, one can define its median. Formally, Definition 6 Let π = {≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n } be a profile of preferences and let ⊑ be a linear order on π(N ). We say that ≻ m ∈ π(N ) is a median preference relation of π if
In other words, ≻ m is a median preference of π if it belongs to π(N ), and at least half of the individuals have preferences that are at least as to the "right" as ≻ m and at least half of the individuals have preferences that are at least as to the "left" as ≻ m . It is clear that any preference profile that satisfies the single-crossing property has a median preference.
We are now ready to state our second result.
Theorem 2 Let π be a preference profile that satisfies the single-crossing property and let a ∈ A be a Condorcet winner with respect to π. Then a is socially acceptable for π.
Proof : Let (≤, ⊑) be the linear orders on A and π(N ), respectively, with respect to which π is single-crossing.
Lemma 1 Let ≻ m ∈ π(N ) be a median preference of π. Its top alternative is socially acceptable.
Proof : Let a be the top alternative of the median preference ≻ m and let i be an individual who ranks a at least as low as any other individual. That is, rank 
